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Reassessing the gReek national schism of WoRld WaR i: 
the ideological PaRameteRs
Basil C. Gounaris and Marianna D. Christopoulos
abstract: The national schism that erupted in greece during World War i has already 
been thoroughly analysed in the bibliography as a crisis of national unification, defined 
by geographical, political and socio-economic criteria. The aim of this article is to move a 
step forward, to support that the national schism might also be considered as an act in the 
broader and much older greek ideological drama, that of the tantalising and incomplete 
“return” to the east via the european West. it is argued that the schism, far from being 
a bipolar confrontation between supporters and opponents of europe, did select from the 
east–West debate whatever arguments were necessary to invest military and political choices 
with a “deeper” meaning. our approach focuses mostly on the rhetoric produced by the 
two opposing camps, the Venizelists and the anti-Venizelist block, from 1914 to 1922. it is, 
however, complemented by a retrospective presentation of the nineteenth-century debate 
over the enlightenment and liberalism, on the one hand, and german idealism, on the other.
The national schism that erupted in greece during the great War was studied 
extensively by historians in the 1970s, when all the primary sources became 
available and their analysis was enriched by political scientists, and seemed 
to have been completed in the 1980s. By that time, after the abolition of the 
monarchy in 1974, the supremacy of the Venizelist political heritage seemed 
too strong to be challenged, as the principles of democracy and modernisation 
dominated greek politics. Venizelos’ legacy has been systematically exploited to 
make the arguments in favour of westernisation more credible. few historians 
have returned to this topic since. This tendency did not change even during the 
current (2015–18) centenary celebrations of World War i.1
 The idea for this article was originally formulated by Basil c. gounaris in his “Unwanted 
legacies: greece and the great War”, in Balkan Legacies of the Great War: The Past Is Never 
Dead, ed. othon anastasakis, david madden and elizabeth Roberts, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
macmillan, 2015, pp. 66–80. Research for the 1910–1922 period was accomplished by dr 
marianna d. christopoulos, during a postdoctoral scholarship from the Research committee 
of the aristotle University of Thessaloniki, in the 2016–17 academic year. The present text was 
drafted by Basil c. gounaris and revised by marianna christopoulos. Both authors are indebted 
to assistant Professor dimitris livanios for his enlightening observations and comments.
1 This became crystal clear after the publication of George Mavrogordatos’ recent books:
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What has encouraged the present reassessment of the national schism is the 
recent greek financial and political crisis. oddly enough, the crisis has renewed 
the question of greece’s position within europe and its proper orientation. 
following the 2015 referendum, it has gradually assumed the proportions of a 
schism. obviously, the question for the average greek family is how to make ends 
meet and not european high politics. nevertheless, a disproportionate part of the 
current public political debate revolves around the essence of our relationship 
with Western europe (in particular with the member states of the european 
Union), compared to our “traditional” bonds with the orthodox east. This 
discussion is enriched and stimulated by various stereotypical generalisations 
and selective historical accounts. apparently, it is more politically convenient 
to analyse politics in terms of friendships or enmities and then to put the blame 
on foreigners, rather than pursue self-criticism and reform.
Underlying this modern debate on europe is the public acknowledgement 
that determining the position of greece between east and West is not a simple 
matter of foreign policy. it is the heated core of the greek identity question 
and the precondition for the making of a cohesive modern greek national 
ideology. Therefore, this identity dilemma is instrumental in creating deep and 
widespread polarisation whatever the real matter under discussion is. it interests 
everyone deeply. observing the dubious benefits of rephrasing a complicated 
or undesirable political question into an easily recognised dilemma, in order to 
secure the desirable social backing or votes, has renewed our research interest in 
the national schism of 1915. as always, present problems and future concerns 
stimulate our conversation with the past. 
The debate over greece’s participation in World War i was one of both 
a diplomatic and military nature, but primarily it was a question of national 
strategy. at a second stage, following the domestic developments in 1915, the 
clash between the king and the prime minister also digressed into a confrontation 
over constitutional legalities. The initial debate was over the military fronts, 
1915: Ο εθνικός διχασμός [1915: the National Schism], Athens: Patakis, 2015 and Μετά το 
1922: Η παράταση του Διχασμού [After 1922: the prolongation of the schism], Athens: Patakis, 
2018. They constitute lucid synopses – but not revisions – of his detailed and illuminating 
analysis of the National Schism on the basis of composite social, economic and geographical 
characteristics. His theory on the nature of the National Schism was presented in his Μελέτες 
και κείμενα για την περίοδο 1909–1940 [Studies and texts for the 1909–1940 period], Athens: 
Sakkoulas, 1982; The Stillborn Republic Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–
1936, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, and Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: Η ύστατη 
κοινοβουλευτική μάχη του 1915 [Eleftherios Venizelos: the ultimate parliamentary battle of 
1915], Athens: Foundation of the Greek Parliament, 2015.
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the course of the battles and the campaigns, and the long-range plan for the 
greek armed forces, given the country’s alliances and ambitions for territorial 
expansion.2 The dilemma which was put to the public – neutrality with king 
constantine i or war with Premier eleftherios Venizelos on the side of the 
entente – was of high risk since no one could safely predict the outcome of the 
war. it was a question for specialists and prophets, not for the common people. 
The stakes were great and the arguments between the two opposing greek camps, 
including accusations of treason and mutual demonisation, were bitter. 
however, much like today, out of the black propaganda and the conflicting 
arguments of the two sides, a parallel conversation emerged: given its culture, 
which was the real position of greece between the two european alliances? 
apparently, the dilemma was not “east or West”. it couldn’t be put this way, for 
Russia in the east was an important ally of Western europe, while the opposite 
pole was not the initially neutral ottoman empire but the central european 
empires. nevertheless, the question of greece’s relation to europe and to the 
West, indirectly yet consistently, pressed for suitable cultural arguments. deciding 
which alliance was more “natural” on cultural grounds presupposed definite clear 
answers to a series of relevant questions beyond strategy and the balance of power: 
Which was the true cultural identity of greece? Who were its “natural” and “true” 
allies? What was its due future course, its mission in the world and the most 
suitable state model for excellence? These questions were asked anew during the 
asia minor campaign in the context of the dramatic shift of the great Powers’ 
policy towards greece. The answers given over a whole decade reintroduced 
through the back door, but in a full-blown way, the eternal question of “east or 
West?” adapted to the great War scheme and necessities. The opposing greek 
views – those in favour of the central Powers and the entente, respectively – will 
be presented as mirror images, each one for and against the two alliances.
Anti-Venizelist Rhetoric
The supporters of the central Powers, that is, the germanophiles, were far from 
a uniform political group, but all belonged to the anti-Venizelist camp, a casual 
alliance of all Venizelos’ political opponents that was without an indisputable 
leader. in terms of germanophilia, they could be classified roughly into three 
sub-groups: The first group was headed by ion dragoumis, a career diplomat 
2 for the diplomatic and political developments in greece concerning its alignment with 
one of the two opposing World War i alliances, see especially george leon, Greece and the Great 
Powers, 1914–1917, Thessaloniki: institute of Balkan studies, 1974; leon, Η Ελλάδα στον Πρώτο 
Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο 1917–1918 [greece during World War i, 1917–1918], athens: miet, 2000.
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and scion of an illustrious family. it was the most coherent of the three groups, 
eloquent, articulate and well-known for its oriental vision, which will be 
presented briefly later on. among dragoumis’ associates were his close friend 
athanassios souliotis-nikolaidis, an army officer and veteran spy, and s.k. 
sokolis, a deputy from corfu.3 The second group was the most numerous. it 
contained germanophile and mostly slavophobic politicians of the first class, 
most of whom had a german education. among them were georgios streit, 
dimitrios gounaris, georgios Theotokis, ioannis metaxas, constantinos 
gioldasis4 and others, who felt a deeper cultural affinity with germany and saw 
in it a victor, a superpower and, according to george mavrogodatos, a model 
for their own domestic “hegemony”.5 The third group consisted mostly of ex-
Venizelists, such as nikolaos dimitrakopoulos, nikolaos stratos, constantinos 
foumis6 and georgios Pop,7 who had shifted their allegiance for various reasons. 
for them germanophilia was an inescapable choice, a reaction to the power 
policy exercised by Britain and france against greece. 
The anti-european sentiments of these three groups, to the extent they 
existed, fluctuated according to the specific views of each group towards 
germany. it should also be noted that their anti-european arguments were not 
the product of a purely greek critique. They were rooted in the West, where the 
3 For this group’s perception of the West, its ideas on the mission of the Greek nation and 
the prospect of an Eastern empire, see Effi Gazi, “Άγγλοι, Γάλλοι και Σενεγαλέζοι: αντιλήψεις 
για το ελληνικό έθνος, τη φυλή και τις αυτοκρατορίες στην Ελλάδα κατάτον Α΄ Παγκόσμιο 
Πόλεμο” [English, French and Senegalese: perceptions of the Greek nation, race and the empires 
in Greece during World War I], in Φυλετικές θεωρίες στην Ελλάδα: Προσλήψεις και χρήσεις στις 
επιστήμες, την πολιτική, τη λογοτεχνία και την ιστορία τηςτέχνης κατάτον 19ο αιώνα [Racial theories 
in Greece: uptake and uses in science, politics, literature and art history in the 19th century], 
ed. Efi Avdela, Dimitris Arvanitakis, Eliza-Anna Delveroudi, Evgenios Matthiopoulos, Socrates 
Petmezas, Tassos Sakellaropoulos, Heraklion: Crete University Press, 2017, pp. 253–272. 
4 Constantinos Gioldasis, publisher of the anti-Venizelist newspaper Αστραπή, was also an 
MP for Attica and Boeotia, elected in December 1915 for Dimitrios Gounaris’ party. 
5 Mavrogordatos, 1915: Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός [1915: the National Schism], pp. 246–247. 
This acute view, that the anti-Venizelists and, especially, the king were inspired by the Prussian 
model for the establishment of their monarchical, military and bureaucratic regime in Greece, 
is not analysed in his work nor connected to the Greek contemporary cultural debate.
6 constantinos foumis was a lawyer, editor and Venizelos’ former collaborator in crete. 
during World War i, however, he shifted to the anti-Venizelist camp and was elected for the 
first time in the december 1915 elections for gounaris’ party. in 1916 he opposed the national 
defence movement. he returned to the Venizelist camp in the 1920s.
7 georgios Pop, an independent supporter of Venizelos in 1910, defected to the opposition, 
disappointed at not having been included in Venizelos’ two first cabinets. he returned to the 
Venizelist camp in december 1915. 
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majority of these anti-Venizelists had been educated or had other connections.8 
They were the product of the wider european criticism of french positivism 
and the principles of liberalism,9 as well as of the admiration for the “deep and 
genuine” german Kultur, over the “superficial” french civilisation.10
to the dedicated greek germanophiles, germany stood for a high imperial 
culture enriched with high humanist ideals,11 which had been forged through 
the deep and long contact of the germans with ancient greek civilisation. 
germanism, like hellenism, was the outcome of large-scale cultural 
dissemination. Unlike British culture, it was not focused on the individual but on 
the whole nation.12 This ideological affinity, the product of german elementary 
education, was the deeper source of their philhellenism, at least until the days 
of Bavarian rule in greece. german philhellenism constituted a deep spiritual 
relationship, motivated neither by philanthropy nor diplomacy. The greek 
struggle for independence was their own struggle: They had always been ready 
to sacrifice themselves for the greek cause.13
8 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “Οι δυτικές πηγέςτων αντιδυτικών επιχειρηματολογιών 
στην ελληνική παιδεία” [The western sources of the anti-western arguments in Greek 
culture], Ευρώπη και νέος Ελληνισμός [Europe and modern Hellenism], Athens: Society for 
the Study of Modern Greek Civilisation and General Culture, 2001, pp. 61–67.
9 Ion Dragoumis was obviously inspired by the nationalistic, anti-parliamentary and 
radical movement Action Française, in particular by Auguste-Maurice Barrès, who, from the 
end of the nineteenth century, challenged the ideals of the French Revolution. See John A. 
Mazis, A Man for All Seasons: The Uncompromising Life of Ion Dragoumis, Istanbul: Isis Press, 
2014, pp. 316–322 (n. 11).
10  John Rundell and stephen mennel (eds.), Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization, 
london: Routledge, 1998, pp. 7, 16–19, 130. an indicative example is Thomas mann’s work 
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, Berlin: s. fischer, 1918. 
11 for example, the anti-Venizelist sokolis, who did not belong to the hardcore 
germanophiles, stressed in his treatise those “unifying” features of the german empire which 
bore resemblance to the greek/Byzantine ones, upon which the new eastern empire was to 
be built. see s.k. sokolis, Αυτοκρατορία [empire], athens: logotechniki Vivliothiki agkira, 
1915, pp. 84–86.
12  Vlassis gavriilidis, Δύω πολιτισμοί [two civilisations], athens: katastimata akropoleos, 
1917, pp. 70, 128. [This work was published serially in Ακρόπολις in 1917]. see also Η αγγλική 
πολιτική και ο Ελληνισμός υπό πρώην διπλωμάτου: Τι διδάσκει η Ιστορία. Εκατονταετής 
δυσμένεια και αντίδρασις της Αγγλίας κατά της Ελλάδος [British politics and greece written 
by a former diplomat: what does history teach? The 100-year disfavour and hostility of Britain 
against greece], athens: s.n., 1917. 
13 Pavlos karolidis, Ο γερμανικός φιλελληνισμός [german philhellenism], athens: s.n., 
1917, p. 50.
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in addition, there were serious strategic arguments favouring an alliance 
with the central Powers, which by then had become the natural rulers of the 
near east.14 austria-hungary might have opposed greek interests in 1913 
during the Bucharest settlement, but had done so only because Vienna thought 
that greece had come under Russian influence. germany, on the other hand, 
had unreservedly supported ceding kavala, a port on the eastern macedonian 
coast, to greece.15 in other words, strategists claimed that austria and germany 
were not, nor would easily become, greece’s antagonists in the region. Young 
germany, the impressive product of the 1871 unification, had become a model 
of accelerating progress and power politics for greece. “germany is carrying 
the new man, the new order, that is, progress,”16 reported michail sakellariou, 
a germanophile newspaper editor. expansionism was inevitable17 and victory 
foreseeable.18 greece was similar to germany; a young and vibrant nation, 
suffocating under the pressure of the old and jealous european nations. Wasn’t 
it obvious on which side it should stand?
in terms of culture, the greek deconstruction of British civilisation and 
culture was an easy task and a definite priority, compared to france. it was a 
retail culture, with a selfish view of what was right or wrong; a nation that had 
betrayed god for mammon and constantly employed the methods of pirates 
and privateers. its constitutional regime was nothing but a myth. Britain was 
governed by a minority of aristocrats, “materialists on the whole, egoists, 
exclusivists, against the people and for the monopolies”, who had deprived 
“the english nation of spiritual ideals, which the humanist-inspired spiritual 
aristocracy of germany had cherished for the german people and had made 
the germans what they were”.19 The hegemony of europe could not be claimed 
by a “complex anglo-saxon nation” with so profound ideological and moral 
contradictions, the result of blending the “cheap blood” of the local islanders 
with the “noble blood” of the germans, danes and norwegians.20 The “allegedly” 
14 Νέα Ημέρα (7 november 1916).
15 menelaos Panas, Σλαβισμός ή Παγγερμανισμός; [slavism or Pangermanism?], athens: 
athinaiko typografeio, 1915, p. 89.
16 Πελοπόννησος (1 January 1917). 
17 anonymous, Η εν Ανατολή γερμανική πολιτική [german politics in the east], athens: 
anatyposis ek estias, 1915, pp. 16–17.
18 see for example the front-page article “Ντουτσλαντ υμπερ αλλες! Η κατάκτησις των 
θαλασσών υποβρύχιως” [deutschland über alles! The conquest of the seas by submarines]”, 
Αστραπή (29 June 1916).
19 gavriilidis, Δύω πολιτισμοί [two civilisations], p. 17.
20 ibid., p. 19.
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liberal english were the true friends of the Bulgarians and the turks, “blunt 
and suppressive tyrants of their own subordinate small nations”. Britain hated 
kings otto and constantine of greece alike because they both refused to become 
the instruments of london like the indian maharajas.21 There had never been 
genuine philhellenism in that country, unless its interests coincided with those 
of greece. greece had never been more than an expendable scout for Britain in 
its overseas operations.22
on the contrary, the deconstruction of the image of france, the defender 
of human and civil liberties for Western civilisation, was not direct, at least 
not from the start. it was publicly and openly acknowledged, even by the anti-
Venizelist Premier georgios Theotokis on the outbreak of war, that france held 
a special position in every greek heart. Yet even this statement was used after 
1915 to emphasise the treason of the french against their old greek friends.23 
naturally, there were direct blows as well. some said that france was not the 
traditional friend of greece but of the ottoman empire. french turcophilia 
and their “mob-controlled regime” had undermined an essential bond with 
greece.24 “The french have always been the same: arrogant in their successes, 
scared in their failures, barbarians and savages, with a polish of civilisation.”25 
The further deconstruction of the french image was accomplished in 1921–22 
after french diplomacy began openly to favour kemal ataturk. now france was 
not only a traitor to greece, but it had also violated the promises it had made 
in the past to all christian nations subject to the ottomans. it was a betrayer of 
christians. “had france been a christian and a civilised nation, it would have 
covered her face in shame with her own hands.”26 it did not, because france 
no longer possessed the essential dignity and nobility. “france is indifferent to 
the france of earlier years, when it had earned the trust of the nations. its only 
concern is money. christian blood, the peace of the world and the prosperity of 
the east are values excluded from the stock market of french political morals. 
french conscience is sensitive only to gold; as Judas iscariot, it is concerned only 
21 menalaos Panas, Φιλελεύθεροι τύραννοι! Ήτοι περιληπτική ιστορική μελέτη περί Αγγλίας 
[liberal tyrants! a brief history of england], athens: typografeio a. Papakonstantinou, 1916, 
p. 19.
22 Η αγγλική πολιτική και ο Ελληνισμός, pp. 3–4, 79–80.
23 see georgios Pop’s parliamentary speech in Εφημερίς των Συζητήσεων της Βουλής 
[Parliamentary debates gazette] [ΕΣΒ], 1915, 1st session, 6th meeting (22 august 1915), p. 
100 and Theotokis’ speech, 1st session, 9th meeting (21 september 1915), p. 156.
24 Πελοπόννησος (18 february 1916 and 18 January 1917).
25 Πελοπόννησος (13 february 1917).
26 Καθημερινή (12 January 1922).
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with the 30 silver coins of the french capitalists.”27 By the early 1920s, as the asia 
minor campaign was turning into a major disaster, this view was shared not only 
by greek germanophiles but by all greeks.28
With a critique based on cultural characteristics, the case of Russia was not 
easier than that of france. The deep-rooted image of mother Russia as the age-
old co-religionist protector of all the orthodox christians in the east could 
not be revised by the anti-Venizelists. They did stress, however, that Russian 
foreign policy, whether of Peter the great or catherine the great, of alexander 
i or nicholas ii, was, in fact, contradictory to the greek Megali Idea (“great 
idea”). Without exception, all Russian rulers wanted to keep constantinople 
for themselves. it was for this very reason that they had worked so intensely to 
undermine king otto’s popularity with his greek subjects, for he was a true and 
keen supporter of the Megali Idea.29 Pro-german politicians also made use of the 
extensive arsenal of arguments against the evil Panslavism before an audience 
highly sensitive to whatever posed a slavic threat to greek macedonia.30 in the 
same manner, italy, which eventually sided with the entente, was exposed for 
its plans to occupy corfu and to manipulate the greek vision of an eastern 
federation in the Balkans to forward its own interests.31
although there were leaflets and articles targeting each of the entente allies, 
it was much more convenient and frequent to blend all kinds of accusations, 
allegations and negative stereotypes together. The study of such texts reveals a 
series of assumptions born of a varied, yet overall anti-european reasoning. The 
first assumption was the negation of philhellenism, a common denominator 
27 Καθημερινή (13 January 1922).
28 Καθημερινή (20, 22 January 1922 and 2 april 1922).
29 Panas, Σλαβισμός ή Παγγερμανισμός;, p. 13.
30 karolidis, Ο γερμανικός φιλελληνισμός [german philhellenism], pp. 51–52; Phokion 
Panas, “Ποίος ο πραγματικός Βενιζέλος” (1928) [Who the real Venizelos is], in Αντιβενιζελικοί 
λίβελοι [anti-Venizelist libels], ed. giorgos anastasiadis, Thessaloniki: University studio 
Press, 2011, p. 372. see also gounaris’ views on the danger of the “Russian serpent” in Αι 
απολογίαι τωνθυμάτωντης 15ης Νοεμβρίου 1922, μετά εισαγωγής υπό Χ. Βοζίκη [The defence 
statements in the court of the victims of 15 november 1922, with an introduction by c. 
Vozikis], athens: typois P.g. makri, 1926, pp. 21–22. The fear of Panslavic intrigues in 
the Balkans had been flared up due to the Russian claims over mount athos during the 
peace settlements of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), see erre gikas,“Και θα ζήσωμεν και 
θα τα διατηρήσωμεν”: Κωνσταντίνος Βασιλεύς [“We shall live and preserve them”: king 
constantine], athens: s.n., 1913, pp. 1, 4–5.
31 antonios kartalis, Η ιταλική πολιτική εν Αλβανία και τοις Βαλκανίοις [italian politics 
in albania and the Balkans], athens: typografeion tou empros, 1914, pp. 138–141; ΕΣΒ, 21st 
session, 7th meeting (2 february 1916), pp. 97–98.
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in greece’s relationship with three entente powers, in order to eradicate any 
relevant moral obligations and to project in its place “pure greek interest” as 
the guiding line of greek foreign policy. 
since the establishment of the greek kingdom, it was argued, philhellenism 
had been taken for granted. it was a dogma that had nurtured generations of 
greeks and was an integral part of private and public education. it was a dogma 
extremely convenient to Venizelos; but it was a fraud, his opponents argued. it 
was not love for present-day greece and its revival but a retrospective love for 
the tombs and ruins of the past.32 even if there had been true philhellenes in 
the past, the occupation of greek territory by the entente armies had cancelled 
their glorious deeds. They warned the Venizelists that there was no gratitude 
among nations, only self-interest.33 The greek national interest was, above all, the 
sentiments of gratitude, stressed gounaris.34 stratos was moderate in his views. 
he did not overlook the moral obligations to and cultural bonds with Western 
europe but acknowledged that the Powers had spheres of interest and satellites. 
in his view, france would assign to greece the mere supervision of its interests.35 
“a nation which mixes politics with sentiments and sacrifices its own interests is 
destined to disappear from the world scene,”36 sakellariou pointed out in march 
1916.37 Venizelos, supposedly, was fighting against this line of reasoning, against 
32  Αστραπή (4 november 1915).
33  ΕΣΒ, 1915, 20th session, 6th meeting (22 august 1915), p. 100.
34 ΕΣΒ, 1915, 20th session, 9th meeting (21 september 1915), p. 164. gounaris had accused 
the Venizelists of advocating a “european” patriotism. see his speeches in Αστραπή (16 august 
1916) and Νέα Ημέρα (28 may 1915).
35 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 18th meeting (10 august 1917), pp. 171–173. four years later, 
under completely different circumstances, stratos declared that the disagreements between 
greeks and foreigners did not nullify the deep gratitude of the greeks for the nations that 
supported them during the 1821 Revolution. he acknowledged that the basic issue was that 
modern greeks had resurrected Byzantium, while the philhellenes admired the ancient 
greeks, their culture and their language. see Πολιτικόν Μνημόσυνον προς τιμήν των κατά 
την Ελληνικήν Επανάστασιν αγωνισθέντων υπέρ αυτής Φιλελλήνων: Λόγος εκφωνηθείς υπό 
Νικολάου Στράτου [Political requiem for the philhellenes of the greek Revolution: speech 
delivered by nikolaos stratos], athens: s.n., 1921, p. 17.
36 Πελοπόννησος (3 march 1916).
37 michail sakellariou was a staunch adherent of anti-Venizelism and a dedicated 
germanophile. in June 1917 he was exiled, together with the rest of the “dangerous” anti-
Venizelists, to corsica by the entente. see Η Ελλάδα του Γεωργίου Α΄: Πολιτική κριτική 
του Μιχαήλ Γ. Σακελλαρίου στην κραυγή του εκπνέοντος Ελληνισμού των Πατρών (1910–
1911) [The greece of king george i: michail sakellariou’s political criticism], intro. Μ. Β. 
sakellariou, athens: national hellenic Research foundation, 2009, pp. 13–47. 
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the profound lessons of history and geography, when he claimed that greece 
could not exist without Britain and france.38 even if france was guided by the 
ideals of liberty and supported the rights of small nations, in the present war, 
argued Theotokis, france was obliged to defend its own interests.39
The second assumption identified the “protection question” with 
subordination to the Western Powers. This debate was triggered in June 1916 
when Britain and france, making reference to their protection rights, demanded 
the demobilisation of the greek army, the resignation of the skouloudis 
government and new elections. The public debate was intensified when Venizelos 
agreed that their rights of protection were legal according to the treaties of 1827 
and 1830.40 in this context, anti-Venizelism was portrayed as the pure patriotic 
party defending greek independence. Venizelists were accused of being traitors 
and the Powers were severely castigated for the pressure they had exerted: for 
eight years their “protection” had been nothing more than a millstone around 
the neck of greece. The Powers had forgotten, asserted dimitrios Rallis, that 
with their signatures they had turned greece into an independent and sovereign 
state, not subject to any protection.41 Yet a review of history would clearly show 
that whenever greece exercised its rights as an independent state in domestic 
or foreign affairs to further its national goals, it was blackmailed, invaded, 
humiliated, blocked or violated. all these actions constituted the real “chain 
of protection” with which greece was kept on a leash.42 only a party of traitors 
could accept compliance with such “protectionist” policies.43 greeks had shed 
their blood to liberate themselves from their tyrants, not to deliver themselves 
to “protectors”.44
38 Πελοπόννησος (18 february 1916 and 3 march 1916). see also Νέα Ημέρα (2 october 
1916) and Εσπερινόν Νέον Άστυ (13 september 1916).
39 ΕΣΒ, 1915, 20th session, 9th meeting (21 september 1915), p. 156.
40 That statement is considered to be one of Venizelos’ most unfortunate political moves. 
see constantinos Zavitsianos, Αι Αναμνήσεις του εκ της ιστορικής διαφωνίας του Βασιλέως 
Κωνσταντίνου και Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου 1914–1922 [memories of the historical disagreement 
between king constantine and eleftherios Venizelos], vol. 1, athens: typois Rodi, 1946, 
pp. 147–148; mavrogordatos, 1915: Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός [1915: the national schism], p. 84.
41 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 20th meeting (12 august 1917), pp. 206–261. Rallis had made 
similar comments in the past, describing the entente’s attitude towards greece as “hubris” 
and a “blow to her pride and sovereignty”. ΕΣΒ, 1915, 20th session, 9th meeting (21 september 
1915), p. 143.
42 Νέα Ημέρα (21 december 1916).
43 Νέα Ημέρα (6 and 7 october 1916); Εσπερινόν Νέον Άστυ (30 september 1916).
44 Σκριπ (11 november 1916).
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The unjustifiable policy of the “protectors” reflected the true character of 
these nations. The British soul was inhuman and the french were ruffians.45 
They tortured greece like the Jews had tortured christ. it was a historical 
irony that Jews were called a rotten nation and the British a noble and 
enlightened one.46 The “Jewishness” of the British will be touched on again 
below, but here let it suffice to say that the connection between profit and 
protection was further strengthened after the end of the war, when it became 
clear that financial interests dominated British and french policy in the near 
east. greek newspapers stated that the protectors of kemal were the great 
capitalists and creditors of turkey. They exploited the resources of a rich land 
that was periodically drenched with armenian or greek blood.47 all these great 
capitalists of europe expected from kemalist turkey favourable capitulations 
of the ottoman style.48 They watched the greek-turkish War as if it were a 
bullfight,49 and placed their bets on turkey or greece only according to the 
expected profits. Unfortunately, greece did not possess coal or oil, nor was it 
inhabited by indians.50
What kind of culture was reflected in europe’s cynical foreign policy? it 
was a rhetorical question. The profound answer given by the germanophiles 
was that the european allies of greece were not civilised but barbarians.51 The 
words “barbarians” and “barbarity” are found in abundance in the texts of this 
war decade and they deliberately negate european culture and civilisation. for 
the anti-Venizelists this was a contradiction in terms.52 it was a civilisation that 
wore white gloves, sneered Pop, but one that had also left greek civilians to 
starve to death.53 Those who had slaughtered humans and liberties alike had 
no right to be called civilised and liberators, wrote a deputy from arcadia in 
the Peloponnese, blaming both the British and the french.54 how did these 
Westerners dare destroy the greek state and nation by claiming as their own the 
45 Πελοπόννησος (10 february 1917).
46 Πελοπόννησος (6 January 1917).
47 Καθημερινή (10 february 1921).
48 Καθημερινή (23 January 1922).
49 Καθημερινή (17 march 1922).
50 Καθημερινή (28 september 1922).
51 Σκριπ (11 november 1916).
52 Σκριπ (23 december 1916).
53 ΕΣΒ, 1916, 21st session, 3rd meeting (27 January 1916), p. 16.
54 Σκριπ (30 december 1916), untitled article written by Panagiotis spyrakis, mP for arcadia.
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torches of civilisation that had been handed over to them by greece?55 The use 
of brutal violence against greece was a disgrace to modern culture.56
What was europe after all? for the greeks, europe once was the British 
fleet, french chivalry, the Russian mass. italy in those days was no more than “a 
bunch of tenors”, germany “a vulgar crowd of scholastics and german Jews” 
and austria-hungary “a mosaic of discontented nationalities”. But things had 
changed since then, argued the opponents of Venizelos. There was another 
europe rising in the new germany. The events in the Balkans (1912–16) clearly 
proved this change and demanded that greek politicians and greek society as a 
whole comprehend it:57 “a french and British victory would signify the triumph 
of the old spirit and the regression of humanity.”58
Venizelist Rhetoric
for the supporters of Premier Venizelos, the reflection of europe was reversed 
but no less disfigured. Their arguments were mostly historical. orthodox Russia, 
noble france, affectionate Britain, “the liberal and mighty ruler of the waves”, 
had taken good care to reinstate the greek nation and had never abandoned it. 
The cessation of the ionian islands to greece in 1864, of epirus and Thessaly 
in 1881, their favourable policy in 1866 during the cretan revolt and in 1897 
during the greek-ottoman War, and, finally, the support of the Venizelist coup 
in 1916 in Thessaloniki were all evidence of their selfless philhellenism.59 The 
noble British philhellenes, among them Byron, church and gladstone, were the 
antecedents of those that the germanophiles called, without any respect, “bloody 
franks”. Yet, what the Philhellenes had done for greece was more important 
than the contribution of the ancient greeks to Western civilisation. The naval 
battle of navarino was more important a lesson for greek children than that 
of salamis.60
55 ΕΣΒ, 1916, 21st session, 55th meeting (25 may 1916), p. 1022: parliamentary speech of 
the anti-Venizelist mP for lesbos, lazaros stamatiadis. 
56 ΕΣΒ, 1916, 21st session, 55th meeting, p. 1025: parliamentary speech of the anti-
Venizelist mP from achaia-ilida, angelos angelopoulos. see also newspaper Νέα Ημέρα 
(14 december 1916) and the anti-Venizelist newspaper Πολιτεία (19 november 1920).
57 Νέα Ημέρα (2 october 1916).
58 Πελοπόννησος (1 January 1917).
59 costas trikoglidis, Η ιστορία του αγγλικού φιλελληνισμού [The history of British 
philhellenism], athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1917, pp. iii–iv, vi–vii.
60 stefanos krateros, Μορφώσατε τον λαόν… πολιτικοκοινωνική μελέτη [educate the 
people… a socio-political study], athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1917, pp. 9, 27.
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for france Venizelists reserved even warmer feelings, not only due to what 
fabvier and maison had done for the greeks or what the french Revolution had 
contributed to the greek enlightenment.61 it was far more than that. Venizelists 
pompously claimed that the two peoples shared ideas, feelings and flaws, and 
on this ground feelings of affection had been rooted. Paris and athens were 
two centres of light; the former for the whole globe and the latter for the east. 
The greeks adored the french language as no other language in the world 
and french law had inspired greek legislators.62 The brave sons of chivalrous 
and most friendly france, who had been raised on odes to the greek heroes of 
independence, had come to macedonia in 1915 to maintain the great traditions 
of their country and to sacrifice themselves in the defence of greek rights.63
even if the allies had violated greek neutrality, argued the distinguished 
lawyer and Venizelist deputy georgios Philaretos, they had done so because 
international law had been breached. after all, they once guaranteed their 
support of a liberal constitution and the integrity of greek territory.64 emmanouil 
Repoulis added that, even if there was no treaty to force their intervention, they 
had a moral obligation, because of the solidarity between free nations.65 They 
would have intervened simply out of goodwill, claimed Venizelos, to defend the 
liberties of the greek people when threatened by a tyrant.66 Yet, Venizelos was 
more of a realist: greece should not simply demand and cajole the friendship 
of foreigners. instead, it should seek comrades who shared common interests.67 
61 emmanouil Repoulis, Ομιλία περί της εν Αθήναις τυραννίας και του αγώνος της Εθνικής 
Αμύνης [speech on the tyranny in athens and the struggle of the national defence], n.p.: 
s.n., 1916, pp. 5, 12–13.
62 georgios Philaretos, Εν πολεμική θεομηνία: Κωνσταντίνος ο Μικρός 1914–1917 [in the 
midst of the turbulence of war: constantine the small, 1914–1917], athens: typografeion 
P.a. Petrakou, 1918, p. 65.
63 ΕΣΒ, 1915, 20th session, 26th meeting (21 october 1915), p. 569 and 9th meeting (21 
september 1915), p. 149.
64 Philaretos, Εν πολεμική θεομηνία [in the midst], pp. 41–42. it should be stressed, 
however, that two years later Philaretos accused the great Powers of becoming the guardians 
of the weaker states without their consent. see georgios Philaretos, Μετά την νίκην [after the 
victory], athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1919, pp. 64–68.
65 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 20th meeting (12 august 1917), p. 128.
66 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 21st meeting (13 august 1917), p. 294. in its editorial titled 
“Redemption”, the Venizelist Εστία expressed both its grief for the country’s plight and its 
relief for the renewal of the “protection rights” of the great Powers a century after greece’s 
liberation. Εστία (9 June 1916).
67 ΕΣΒ, 1915, 20th session, 9th meeting (21 september 1915), p. 157. The Venizelist press 
repeatedly accused the anti-Venizelist governments of handling foreign affairs with arrogance 
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fighting germany and beating it and its two clients, Bulgaria and the ottoman 
empire, its own traditional enemies, would help greece to restore its honour, 
protect its interests and eventually gain a place within the family of free nations.68
according to Philaretos, the final victory of the entente would be followed 
by a european federation, the United states of europe, an old french idea of 
king henry iV.69 This federation would guarantee religious tolerance, civil and 
national rights. Α no less ideal form of international governance was the fresh 
model of the British commonwealth, then under consideration, which provided 
for the political independence of its member states along with the obligation to 
support their metropolis.70 This implied that the victory of the entente would not 
carry as much of a threat for the small nations as wholesale german rule over 
europe. in the event of large-scale german rule, the equality of the nation-states 
would be abolished as in the days of the Roman empire. “The soul of europe 
and indeed of the whole world is disgusted by military satrapism,” remarked 
Philaretos.71 “The most typical imperialism of our times is the german one,” wrote 
george Papandreou, because it combined the tradition of Prussian feudalism with 
the vertigo that german modern progress had unleashed. “it was characterised 
by discontent, impatience, passion, brutality, arrogance, an overestimation of 
quantity, an underestimation of individuals, a love of violence, a relentless desire 
for power, greed to dominate the world.”72 The german view that “power is the 
and no pragmatism. see, for example, Εστία, which 10 days after the imposition of a naval 
blockade on greece by the entente cried out for realism on the part of the anti-Venizelist 
government, advising it to resign instead of provoking the great Powers. Εστία (5 June 1916). 
68 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 21st meeting (13 august 1917), p. 302.
69 Philaretos, Εν πολεμική θεομηνία [in the midst], p. 102. The prospect of a united europe 
was acknowledged as a possible postwar scenario by the anti-Venizelists, too. see, for example, 
the view of an anti-Venizelist mP, constantine fοumis, in ΕΣΒ, 21st session, 55th meeting 
(25 may 1916), p. 1024.
70 alfred eckhard Zimmern, Η γερμανική κουλτούρ και η βρεταννική δημοκρατία: Τα 
ιδεώδη του βρεταννικού πολιτισμού [german kultur and British democracy: the ideals of 
British culture], trans. c. s. chourmouzios, athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1917, p. 5.
71 Philaretos, Εν πολεμική θεομηνία [in the midst], p. 101.
72 georgios Papandreou, “Η Ευρώπη προ του πολέμου” [europe on the eve of the war], 
Επιθεώρησις των κοινωνικών και πολιτικών επιστημών 1/1–2 (september–december 1916), 
pp. 46–70. a Venizelist mP from lesbos, christos Vasilakakis, in his book, expressed similar 
views, underlying that the deeds of the hohenzollerns justified honoré mirabeau’s comment 
that war was Prussia’s national industry. Ο Παγγερμανισμός: Μελέτη πολιτικό-ιστορική 
[Pangermanism: a political and historical study], athens: typografika katastimata el. 
Papapavlou, 1917, p. 13. see also d.f.P., Η κατά του Ελληνισμού συνωμοσία του Γερμανισμού 
[german intrigue against greece], athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1916, passim. others 
emphasised the “sacred” nature of the war due to the adulation of kaiser Wilhelm ii. see Κ.Τ., 
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ultimate right” for humans and nations was a clear sign that they intended to 
abolish the sovereignty of weaker nations. This view showed the difference between 
the global character of the British political ideal and the “narrow egoism of the 
german soul.”73 contrary to Panslavism, Pangermanism was not a future threat for 
the Balkans and asia minor but a present one.74 This threat was not only national, 
argued the socialist deputy aristotelis sideris. This war was a fight for democratic 
principles, which were defended by the great nations of the West: “if we are against 
the subordination of individuals to one social class, we are even more so against 
the subordination of entire nations to one dynastic and military class, like that of 
germany.”75 german militarism would be the darkest future, for which the greek 
people had absolutely no desire,76 added albert couriel, a Jewish socialist deputy 
from Thessaloniki. Yet this threat was overlooked by the “german greeks”, who 
had either been bribed or simply hated Venizelos. it was also overlooked by those 
who could not see that the german culture they loved cultivated the principles of 
absolutism and subordination to one superman tyrant.77
in reading the above-mentioned arguments and counter-arguments, it is 
clear that the Venizelists did not support their options by referencing their allies’ 
ideological, political and economic characteristics. apparently, none of them 
(certainly not Venizelos) disregarded the virtues of Western parliamentarianism 
and liberalism,78 and such remarks can easily be traced in their speeches.79 
Η διανοητικότης των Γερμανών και ο πόλεμος [german apprehension and the war], athens: 
typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1916, pp. 17–18.
73 Zimmern, Η γερμανική κουλτούρ [german kultur], p. 4.
74  Philaretos, Εν πολεμική θεομηνία [in the midst], pp. 9, 14, 24.
75 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 21st meeting (13 august 1917), p. 304. see also his article 
“Το δημοκρατικόν πνεύμα και ο Ελληνισμός” [The spirit of democracy and hellenism], 
Ριζοσπάστης (26 July 1917).
76 ΕΣΒ, 1917, 20th session, 20th meeting (12 august 1917), p. 245. for an analysis of the 
influences and the greek socialists’ stance towards the war, see kostas Paloukis, “Οι Έλληνες 
Σοσιαλιστές, ο εθνικός διχασμός και ο Α΄ Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος” [greek socialists, the national 
schism and World War i], Μαρξιστική Σκέψη 21 (october–december 2016), pp. 191–202.
77 dimitris tagkopoulos, Οι Γερμανοέλληνες (Απόσπασμα από την πολιτική μελέτη: Ο 
Ψυχάρης και η πολιτική) [The germano-greeks. excerpt from the political study: Psycharis 
and politics], athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1918, pp. 4–5.
78 in a pamphlet, published in 1918, Philaretos tried to prove the “democratic” nature of 
the greeks who supported their liberal allies in their struggle “against german militarism 
and in favour of democracy”. see georgios n. Philaretos, Δημοκρατισμός του Έλληνος [The 
democratic nature of the greeks], athens: s.n., 1918, p. 1.
79 see for example ΕΣΒ, 20th session, 21st meeting (13 august 1917), p. 302 and meeting 
35 (23 november 1918), p. 459. see also marianna d. christopoulos, “‘Ο ονειροπόλος 
πραγματοποιός’: Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα, 1909–1923” [“The visionary 
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They were all fully aware of the immense socio-economic and political benefits 
that an entente victory would have for greece, the liberal Party and its 
entrepreneurial clientele.80 Yet for Venizelist rhetoric, philhellenism, as the other 
side of protectionism, was the key argument for supporting an alliance with the 
entente.81 Western liberalism, the ideals of the democratic nations and the noble 
ideals of the americans were only vaguely presented notions; the european 
federal future was hazy and democratic principles were more interesting for 
the still few enemies of the monarchy and the even fewer socialists. The “world 
ideal” of the British and the french was not elucidated because advocating for 
colonialism was a demanding and undesirable task. The cultures of the Western 
powers were the “relatives” of greek culture by virtue of their “greek-latin 
nature”; therefore greece’s position on the side of the entente was predestined.82
in terms of communication and given the fierce political controversy, the 
projection of the dark side of german ideology was much more useful for the 
Venizelist camp. The most solid ideological argument of those who supported 
participation in the war alongside the entente was the condemnation of the 
militaristic, greedy and arrogant model of progress, with relevant references to 
the threat it posed for the small nations. in other words, they stressed similar 
negative characteristics to those attributed by the germanophiles to the anglo-
french and their capitalist Western civilisation. This view was shared by all 
the entente states: german civilisation was the archetypical enemy of liberal 
democracy.83
The germanophiles, on the other hand, found it difficult to cancel the 
memory of philhellenism purely on the grounds of anti-slavic arguments, which 
also contradicted the tradition that saw Russia as the orthodox protector of 
greece. They also had difficulties in offering a political vision. What exactly 
would happen if the central Powers won the war and the Western “chain of 
protection” was broken? This is why, we argue, their line of argumentation 
pragmatist”: eleftherios Venizelos and the great idea, 1909–1923], in Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: 
Η διαμόρφωση της πολιτικής σκέψης του. Ιδεολογικές αφετηρίες και επιδράσεις [eleftherios 
Venizelos: the formation of his political thought. ideological starting points and effects], ed. 
nikolaos Papadakis, athens: foundation of the greek Parliament and Venizelos foundation, 
2014, p. 263.
80 mavrogordatos, 1915: Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός [1915: the national schism], p. 243.
81 Πατρίς (28 June 1916). see also Venizelos’ speech in athens, Πατρίς (11 June 1917).
82 despina Papadimitriou, “Ο Τύπος και ο Διχασμός 1914–1917” [The press and the 
schism, 1914–1917], Phd diss., national and kapodistrian University of athens, 1990, pp. 
264–267.
83 ibid., pp. 260–264.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 07:59:22 |
 Reassessing the Greek National Schism of World War I 253
focused on the prospects of greek civilisation. for them, the german empire – 
even if it was part of the West – was the best model on which to build a vibrant 
and independent nation-state or establish an eastern greek empire.
The ‘Anti-western’ Vision of an Eastern Empire
The specialist in this theoretical field of germanophilia, or rather of anti-
Westernism, was dragoumis, an anti-Venizelist hardliner and leader of a group 
which evangelised for the creation of an eastern empire.84 in his published 
and unpublished writings, an anti-Western model theory was adapted to the 
political and military developments of the time.85 This standardised theory was 
used selectively by other pro-german writers and journalists.86 for dragoumis, 
the spirit of modern european civilisation and culture was “mostly Jewish”. 
“The societies of europe,” he wrote, “have been administered since 1914 by the 
philistines of science and a bourgeois class with Jewish ideals.”87 The societies 
of france and Britain were characterised by a “moral confusion” that testified 
to a “shortage of racial ideals”. The Russians were saved because they possessed 
“an eastern soul”; thus they were more religious, rougher, younger, future-
oriented and “fitter to accomplish their eastern mission”.88 The spirit of the 
84 The published literature on ion dragoumis’ life and ideas is thorough, rich and varied. 
to cite but few, in addition to mazis’ book (see n. 9): John a. mazis, “The challenge of the 
West and challenging the West: ion dragoumis and the Place of modern greece in the east-
West cultural continuum”, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 26–27 (2010–2011), pp. 57–70; 
michalis kaliakatsos, “ion dragoumis and ‘machiavelli’: armed struggle, Propaganda and 
hellenization in macedonia and Thrace (1903–1908)”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 31 
(2013), pp. 53–84; michalis kaliakatsos, “dragoumis, macedonia and the ottoman empire 
(1903–1913): The great idea, nationalism and greek-ottomanism”, Phd diss., University 
of Birmingham, 2008; Rena stavridi-Patrikiou, “Ίων Δραγούμης: Πηγές και στόχοι του 
εθνικισμού” [ion dragoumis: sources and goals of nationalism], in Η Ελλάδα των Βαλκανικών 
Πολέμων [greece in the Balkan Wars], athens: elia, 1993, pp. 243–252; a. J. Panayotopoulos, 
“The ‘great idea’ and the Vision of eastern federation: a Propos of the Views of i. dragoumis 
and a. souliotis-nikolaïdis”, Balkan Studies 21/2 (1980), pp. 331–365.
85 gazi, “Άγγλοι, Γάλλοι και Σενεγαλέζοι” [english, french and senegalese], pp. 255–271.
86 mazis, “The challenge of the West”, pp. 57–70.
87 ion dragoumis, Φύλλα ημερολογίου Ε΄ (1913–1917) [Pages from a diary, vol. 5, 1913–
1917], ed. Theodoros n. sotiropoulos, athens: ermis, 1986, p. 54. he called Venizelos Jewish, 
too. see Thanassis Bohotis, “Εσωτερική Πολιτική 1900–1922” [domestic politics, 1900–1922], 
in Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα: Όψεις πολιτικής και οικονομικής ιστορίας 1900–1940 
[history of greece in the twentieth century: aspects of political and economic history, 1900–
1940], ed. christos hadziiossif, athens: Vivliorama, 2009, p. 97.
88 dragoumis, Φύλλα ημερολογίου Ε΄ [Pages from a diary, vol. 5], p. 85.
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West was “extremely despotic and absolute”, and Romanism was the incarnation 
of absolutism, wrote sokolis.89 dragoumis and sokolis were not alone. Their 
anti-Western scepticism was used widely by the anti-Venizelists, though mostly 
at face value. The civilisation of Britain and france was phony, added Vlassis 
gavriilidis, the editor of Ακρόπολις: 
These false ideals [liberty, equality, fraternity], which, in the case of 
france and Britain, hide nothing else but individual arbitrariness, 
governmental violence and moral chaos, direct like the beacons 
of hell the governing classes of france and Britain. This is why we 
have two states of Violence, two states of lawlessness, two states of 
Bare individualism, two commercial Republics like those of genoa 
and Venice. mechanism, individualism, mammonism, soullessness, 
capitalism – these are the demons governing these two nations. if 
they are not beheaded by germany, they will be beheaded by the 
ongoing progress of their own peoples, that is, if the world goes on 
progressing. The same demons are now dragging to the dance of hell 
the great american Republic; the same disease, the same symptoms.90
The problem was not Western culture in itself but, most importantly, its 
imitation, its adulterated copy, Venizelism. it was a true disease, which was 
described by spyridon melas in Νέον Άστυ:
Venizelism is nothing else but frankism [the imitation of the 
“franks”] in politics. Under the healthy surface there was the most 
dangerous disease. on the pretext of realism, [Venizelism] traded 
greece as if it was a boat full of onions. Under the sign of progress, 
it excited individualism and mass arrivisme. Under the pretext of 
renaissance, it tried to achieve the negation of tradition. Under the 
pretext of alliances, it sought to settle the frank in the heart of the 
country.91
The imitation of the “franks” is a central issue in dragoumis’ thoughts, treasured 
in his diaries. The words “civilisation” and “progress” misled all the witless, those 
ignorant of history and philosophy, “frank”-educated scientists and those who 
had been “sprinkled” with foreign education who had forgotten that a civilisation 
might also regress.92 The “xenomania” – french-mania and english-mania 
– of Venizelist politics led to subordination to the “franks”. it was a “servile 
89 sokolis, Αυτοκρατορία [empire], pp. 22, 113.
90 gavriilidis, Δύω πολιτισμοί [two civilisations], p. 70.
91 Bohotis, “Εσωτερική Πολιτική” [domestic politics], p. 96. 
92 dragoumis, Φύλλα Ημερολογίου Ε΄ [Pages from a diary, vol. 5], p. 85.
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xenomania”, for its purpose was to serve the will of the foreigners.93 “We are 
intimidated by the franks […] we tend to forget our interest in exchange for 
a good word by the franks.”94 greece, guided by Venizelos, who had matured 
politically in crete, then controlled by foreign consuls, has regressed to the days 
of kolettis and mavrokordatos (the 1840s and 1850s), when the greek parties 
had foreign patrons.95 his men had become the “ruffians of the foreigners”.96 as 
dragoumis concluded in a 1919 text:
What is it in Venizelism that i despise? Venizelism is possibilisme, 
materialism, earthly, success with magic tricks, resourcefulness, 
skilfulness, arrivisme, demagogy. Venizelism is tangled with the 
modern, superficial, seemingly scientific ideas of europe; it is a 
european, frankish shining polish, a rough plaster to cover a badly 
built wall or the repulsive make-up of a beautiful woman.97
all these morbid features of Venizelism (arrivisme, adventurism, etc.) were 
repeated by christos christoulakis, the director of the journal Πολιτική 
Επιθεώρησις, to conclude with the worst of all, franco-levantinism, which 
Venizelos had brought from his own past in chania, where “social life […] 
contained many levantine features”.98 he believed that european culture 
was superior and that he had run to catch up with it; he wanted to show that 
he was thinking the european way, to be justified and appreciated by the 
europeans.99 corrupt from demagogy and levantinism, he had made a cult out 
of the “humble worship of the foreign”, explained souliotis-nikolaidis. for his 
xenomania and servility, he was the suitable politician to place greece at the 
disposal of foreigners.100 costas karavidas, a foe of katharevousa and defender of 
communalism, later wrote that, after all, the role of the franco-levantine usurers 
has always been to exercise pressure on behalf of the great Western Powers on the 
93 ibid., p. 116.
94 ibid., p. 117.
95 ibid., p. 121.
96 ibid., p. 167.
97 ion dragoumis, Φύλλα Ημερολογίου Στ΄ (1918–1920) [Pages from a diary, vol. 6 (1918–
1920)], ed. Theodoros n. sotiropoulos, athens: ermis, 1987, p. 34. 
98 christos christoulakis, Ποίος πραγματικώς είνε ο Βενιζέλος: Ψυχολογική και πολιτική 
κριτική [Who Venizelos really is: a psychological and political review], athens: ekdosis 
Politikis epitheoriseos, 1916, pp. 21–22.
99 ibid., pp. 51–52.
100 see athanassios souliotis-nikolaidis’ article titled “Το καθήκον” [The duty] in Νέα 
Ημέρα (25 august 1916).
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chest of the orient.101 it was ironic that these accusations of xenomania coming 
from the demoticists were aligned with those of their enemies, the supporters of 
katharevousa, when the demotic language was introduced to greek elementary 
education in 1917. for different reasons, both groups thought that Venizelos was 
deliberately being carried away from greek tradition. to make his decision even 
more suspicious, this breach of tradition was always corelated with the threat it 
posed to the orthodox church.102
The offence against franco-levantinism, which was not the exclusive task of 
dragoumis’ group, also extended to Venizelos’ officials. They had been educated 
in foreign universities but, instead of becoming the “juice of life”, they aspired 
to become civil servants.103 a ioannina deputy, constantinos kazantzis, openly 
accused the functionaries of the foreign ministry of not being greek but semi-
french, as their partiality for the “franks” was overwhelming.104 also condemned 
in the same manner were the frenchified greeks of the diaspora, supporters of 
the liberals in their majority, who had “forgotten their language and shaved off 
their moustache”.105 some were even accused of pressuring greece to enter the 
war as a way to serve their own financial interests.106
Which was the proper ideal for greece as it was threatened by the levant 
and how was it to be pursued? in dragoumis’ view, this ideal was situated in 
the east. it was an “eastern federation”, an “east for the easterners”, where 
hellenism would occupy the key position.107 Returning to greece’s roots, to 
tradition, to folk life and to the demotic vernacular would create a “new greek 
civilisation”, different from the ancient, the Byzantine and the modern european. 
it would be more perfect, free from sterile archaisms with many eastern elements, 
more eastern than western but “different from both of them”.108 inescapably it 
101 c. d. karavidas, “Ρήγας Φερραίος και η πολιτική οργάνωσις της Ανατολής” [Rhigas 
feraios and the political organisation of the east], Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις 1/41 (20 march 1921), 
p. 660. see also “Η κατάπτωσις της Αντάντ” [The entente’s decadence], Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις 
1/52 (24 december 1916), pp. 1730.
102 Panas, “Ποίος ο πραγματικός Βενιζέλος” [Who Venizelos really is], p. 374. see also 
Pezonautis-dikaiokritis, “Τα πολιτικά παράσημα του κ. Βενιζέλου” (1920) [mr. Venizelos’ 
political decorations], in anastasiadis, Αντιβενιζελικοί λίβελοι [anti-Venizelist libels], p. 105.
103 Σκριπ (14 october 1916).
104 Νέα Ημέρα (3 december 1916).
105 ΕΣΒ, 21st session, 17th meeting (13 february 1916), pp. 316–317.
106 Εσπερινόν Νέον Άστυ (10 october 1916).
107 ion dragoumis, “Αυτοκρατορία και Ανατολή” [empire and the east], Πολιτική 
Επιθεώρησις 1/32 (6 august 1916), p. 1087.
108 Έρευνα για τις μελλοντικές κατευθύνσεις της φυλής μας [survey on the future goals of 
our race], alexandria: ekdosi grammaton, 1919, p. 50.
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would be different from the model pursued by the greek state. “Those dressed 
in the frankish way, low and vulgar state,” wrote dragoumis, had tried to give 
to the greeks “an alternative ideal, that of a grocery – to become a bourgeois 
Belgium, a neutral, eunuch, milk-producing switzerland – and to take them 
off their course”.109 it was an unsuited alien civilisation that looked down 
on easterners, because it could not comprehend their “sensuality” and their 
“delicate intelligence”, added christoulakis.110 The east was the due destination 
for greece, chosen by Rhigas feraios and by alexandros Ypsilantis, but changes 
had happened. economic interests, according to karavidas, had turned those 
who were better off into “materialist and vulgar” people and had reduced the 
ability of the lower classes to seek radical solutions. The catalyst which had 
diverted the eastern course of greece were the franco-levantines, who had 
added “lines of demarcation” and “poisonous shadows”. These were the lines of 
nationalism and statehood, the products of Western civilisation and diplomatic 
tools of the Powers, used to manipulate not only the christians of the east but 
also the turks. Young turkism and its chauvinistic violence were the products 
of Western manipulation.111 The same was true for intra-orthodox strife. it 
would lead them all, after their economic and political subjugation, to religious 
subordination to the pope, who also was a part of the Western system.112
The ideal of an eastern federation as the greek destiny was also served by 
the pro-german side under a different mantle, that of the empire. in sokolis’ 
book Αυτοκρατορία, the narration is the same as that of dragoumis. The greek 
medieval empire had fallen because it had been struck by the “franks”, who also 
changed its name from Roman to Byzantine to cut it loose from both ancient 
109 idas, “Ο νεοελληνικός πολιτισμός” [modern greek civilisation], Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις 
1/23 (7 november 1920), p. 375; ion dragoumis, Προγραμματικοί πολιτικοίστοχασμοί 
[Political reflections], athens: typografeion P.a. Petrakou, 1916, p. 5.
110 christoulakis, Ποίος πραγματικώς είνε ο Βενιζέλος [Who Venizelos really is], p. 51.
111 karavidas, “Ρήγας Φερραίος” [Rhigas feraios], pp. 659–660; Ε. loukaras, “Ανατολή 
και Δύσις” [The east and the West], Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις 1/32 (16 January 1921), p. 524.
112 loukaras, “Ανατολή και Δύσις” [The east and the West], pp. 509–511. The danger of 
the “Westernisation” of the orthodox church due to the influences of the Uniate and papism 
had been a key issue in the ideological ferment of the nineteenth century, which surfaced 
not only during the schism but also later during the calendar reform of 1924. for the latter, 
see especially dimitris malessis, “Το παλαιοημερολογιτικό ζήτημα (1924–1952): Όψειςτης 
πολιτικής και πολιτισμικής σύγκρουσης στο Μεσοπόλεμο και στη μεταπολεμική περίοδο” 
[The calendar question: aspects of a political and cultural clash in the interwar and postwar 
period (1924–1952)], Μνήμων 22 (2000), pp. 135–169; mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, 
pp. 269–270.
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greece and Rome.113 feraios had wished to revive this empire, but the zeal of 
the nationalist italians derailed the greeks who had studied in the West. only 
those who were resistant to foreign ideas did not fall into the frankish trap 
of nationalism, “this alien principle of nationality”. greece buried the empire, 
when, impressed by the materialistic progress of the Westerners, they introduced 
their ideas, which were, albeit, incompatible with its own.114 eventually, 
nationalism led the easterners to a fratricidal struggle and patriotism turned into 
a “commercial enterprise”. greeks left the interpretation of their history to the 
West, they neglected (unlike the germans) the importance of the spiritual bonds 
between them and they assigned unification to a single mighty state, indeed an 
impossible mission. The deeper essence of the empire to which he aspired was 
the prevalence of the greek spirit and the brotherhood of the eastern peoples;115 
because the medieval eastern empire – not the West – was the true cradle 
of liberty, fraternity, cosmopolitanism, altruism, piety, parliamentarianism 
and even socialism. When loukas notaras said that the turkish turban was 
preferable to the papist tiara, he was afraid that these virtues would be lost if 
the greek were assimilated by the Western spirit of selfishness and by Roman 
catholicism. They had all been lost when the independent greek kingdom came 
into being and the imitation of the West was initiated. These virtues would only 
be recovered through the imperial ideal.116
sokolis was an extremely interesting, yet isolated, case. he believed that the 
imperial idea should be promoted through education, the army and the church. 
But Pavlos karolidis, professor of history at the University of athens and a 
native of cappadocia, had a more handy and suitable solution in mind. king 
constantine i personified, in the best possible way, the ideal of “greek kingship”, 
which was adaptable to sokolis’ imperial ideal. for karolidis, kingship was not 
a european custom but had developed institutionally and philosophically in the 
greek context from ancient to medieval times. kingship in the days of Byzantium 
had been connected to the nation and had advanced the idea of national unity; 
and it was this idea – the legend of the marbled last king to be revived by the angel 
of god, a legend that was also shared by the german people – that had actually 
revived the greek state. after the greek kingdom was established, however, its 
kingship was implemented in the european fashion. as a result, the reigns of 
both otto and george i were tormented by these two different perceptions of 
113 sokolis, Αυτοκρατορία [empire], p. 18. see also dragoumis’ resume and comments on 
sokolis’ Αυτοκρατορία in “Αυτοκρατορία και Ανατολή” [empire and the east], pp. 1083–1091.
114 sokolis, Αυτοκρατορία [empire], pp. 29, 33, 40.
115 ibid., pp. 62–86.
116 ibid., pp. 67, 109–136.
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kingship, the european and the greek. constantine, inspired by history, felt 
he had the strength and the will to be the incarnation of the greek model. But 
there was a problem; greece was already in the third stage of its history. in the 
previous two it had been the creator, teacher and legislator of europe. in this 
third stage it compared unfavourably to europe. it needed european support 
to develop effectively as a nation-state. But in this need for capital and material 
support from europe, greece should not lose its spirit, literature, language, art 
and, least of all, its theory of kingship. it should not distance itself from this 
great and glorious “royal way”, illumined by the ample light of history. This 
royal or imperial road was the way to salvation and to the glory of the greek 
nation, provided it resisted the corrupt influence of Western culture.117 all in all, 
if the salvation for the greeks was an empire or federation united by its eastern 
culture and by the Byzantine imperial legacy, then the germans had already 
provided them with a model to challenge Western european individualism and 
nationalism. greeks should follow them.
The Roots of the Debate
These views of dragoumis, karolidis, sokolis and others were not new, and 
here lies the main argument of this article. to be precise, these men did not 
reintroduce a debate from the past, because this debate was not yet over. They 
simply rekindled it. although the context and the intensity of this debate had 
changed through a decade of war, it was in direct contact with all the previous 
stages, to the extent that these stages could offer simple and comprehensible 
arguments to the present. indeed, the debate on the real position of greece 
between the east and the West, europe and asia, was age-old, older than the 
greek state itself. its various philosophical connotations and nuances are not 
our concern here. What we will present next is the exploitation or the reflection 
on the politics of this old tug-of-war between the enlightenment and liberalism, 
on the one hand, and german idealism, on the other, during the nineteenth 
century. The stakes were high: to shape a policy and an identity that would unite 
the state in a modern version of hellenism after its gradual deliverance from the 
ottomans. This is a very broad topic with an extensive literature, dominated by 
117 Pavlos karolidis, Η ελληνική βασιλεία ως εθνική ιδέα: Λόγος εκφωνηθείς υπό Π. 
Καρολίδου κατ’ εντολήν του Δ. Συμβουλίου της Εταιρείας Φίλωντου Λαού κατά την 
ονομαστικήν εορτήν της Α.Μ. του Βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου τη 21 Μαΐου 1916 [greek kingship 
as a national idea: a speech delivered on the name day of his majesty king constantine], 
athens: P. leonis, 1916, pp. 5–6, 38–45.
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the works of dimaras118 and skopetea,119 and important reviews by kitromilides,120 
Varouxakis,121 katsiardi,122 koliopoulos,123 Velkova,124 moutafidou,125 as well as 
the recent doctoral dissertation by apostolos charissis.126
118 c. Th. dimaras, “Η φωτισμένη Ευρώπη” [The enlightened europe], Νέα Εστία 51/591 
(15 february 1952), pp. 225–230 and 51/592 (1 march 1952), pp. 306–311. This paper was 
republished in dimaras, Φροντίσματα [treatises], athens: Boukouri, 1962, pp. 3–23 and 
Ιστορικά Φροντίσματα, Α΄: Ο Διαφωτισμός και το κορύφωμά του [historic treatises, 1: the 
enlightenment and its peak], athens: Poria, 1992, pp. 115–129 and 279–281. see also dimaras, 
Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός [modern greek enlightenment], 1977; athens: ermis, 1989. 
119 elli skopetea, Το“πρότυπο βασίλειο” και η μεγάλη ιδέα: όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος 
στην Ελλάδα (1830–1880) [The “model kingdom” and the great idea: aspects of the national 
question in greece (1830–1880)], athens: Polytypo, 1988; skopetea, Φαλμεράυερ: τεχνάσματα 
του αντιπάλου δέους [fallmerayer: devices of the opposition], athens: Themelio, 1999; 
skopetea, “The Balkans and the notion of the ‘crossroads between east and West”, in Greece 
and the Balkans, Identities, Perceptions and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment, ed. 
dimitris tziovas, ashgate: Routledge, 2003, pp. 171–178.
120 Paschalis kitromilides, “europe and the dilemmas of greek conscience”, in Greece 
and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship, ed. Philip carabott, 
london: centre for hellenic studies, 1995, pp. 1–15. see also the significant observations in 
kitromilides, Νεοελληνικός διαφωτισμός: οι πολιτικές και κοινωνικές ιδέες [modern greek 
enlightenment: political and social ideas], trans. stella nikoloudi, athens: ΜΙΕΤ, 2000. 
121 georgios Varouxakis, “The idea of ‘europe’ in nineteenth-century greek Political 
Thought”, in carabott, Greece and Europe in the Modern Period, pp. 16–37.
122 olga katsiardi-hering, “identitätssuche und europa-Bild der neugriechen vom 17. bis 
zum anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts”, in Die Griechen und Europa: Außen- und Innensichten im 
Wandel der Zeit, ed. harald heppner and olga katsiardi-hering, Vienna: Böhlau, 1998, pp. 
31–68. in the same volume, see also effi gazi, “‘europe’: Writing an ambivalent concept in 
19th century greek historical culture”, pp. 103–124. 
123 ioannis s. koliopoulos, Δυτικά της Εδέμ: η ανακαίνιση του ελληνικού έθνους και η 
νοσταλγία του ‘Ανατολικού παρελθόντος’: Δοκίμια της περιόδου 1989–2004 [West of eden: the 
renovation of the greek nation and the nostalgia forits eastern past], Thessaloniki: epikentro, 2010. 
124 sanya Velkova, “The megali idea and national identity in the Period between the 
two World Wars (conditions and development of the Problem)”, Études balkaniques 3–4 
(1996), pp. 19–34.
125 ariadni moutafidou, “Το ‘πνεύμα του πολιτισμού’ και η ‘υπερήφανος Δύσις’: η 
πρόσληψη της Δύσης στον ελληνικό Τύπο κατά τη μεταβατική περίοδο 1843–1866” [The 
“spirit of civilisation” and the “proud West”: the perception of the West in the greek press 
during the transition years, 1843–1866], Τα Ιστορικά 28/55 (december 2011), pp. 443–462.
126 apostolos charissis, “Η σχέση Ανατολής–Δύσης ως φιλοσοφικοϊστορικό πρόβλημα 
στην ελληνική και τη ρωσική κοινωνική σκέψη: Συγκριτική προσέγγιση” [The east–West 
relation as a philosophical and historical problem in greek and Russian social thought: a 
comparative approach], Phd diss., Panteion University, 2015.
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it is worth mentioning at the beginning of this brief retrospective georgios 
kozakis-typaldos’ 1839 work A philosophical essay on the progress and fall of old 
Greece.127 in this book, hellenism, because of the region’s climate, the physical 
environment and geographical position, bridged the east with the West. it was 
a concept based on ancient writers, yet easy to associate with the actual position 
of the greeks as a financial and social go-between in the region in the early 
years of the nineteenth century.128 The role of greece in history was depicted 
more clearly a year later in an article by markos Renieris (1840) under the title 
“on the law of human history”.129 in this he assigned to the greek nation the 
romantic mission of solving the question of mutual understanding between the 
east and the West, as well as the political question of the east, that is, the eastern 
Question.130 The basic work of Renieris on this matter is his What is Greece? East 
or West? (1842).131 his conclusion was that by accepting the West, greece was 
accomplishing its own nationalism (εθνισμός) and it had taken over the mission 
of leading the West to “morally conquest” and to “rejuvenate” the east.
This mission took the shape of a real policy with kolettis’ well-known speech 
in the greek national assembly in 1844:
in its geographical position, greece is the centre of europe; having 
on her right the east and on her left the West, she was destined by 
her fall to illuminate the West and, by her renaissance, the east. The 
former task was accomplished by our forefathers; the latter has been 
assigned to us. in the spirit of this oath and of this Megali Idea, i saw 
the nation’s deputies coming to decide not only the fate of greece but 
of the whole greek race.132
in other words, the great idea of hellenism was not, as it is usually thought, only 
the liberation of the greeks but also the revival of the east itself. The great idea 
of greece was placed in the east, without denouncing its role as mediator. This 
127 georgios kozakis-typaldos, Φιλοσοφικόν δοκίμιον περί της προόδου και της πτώσεως 
της παλαιάς Ελλάδος [a philosophical essay on the progress and fall of old greece], athens: 
ek tis typografias P. mantzaraki, 1839.
128 charissis, Η σχέση Ανατολής–Δύσης [The east–West relationship], pp. 199–202.
129 m.R., “Περί του νόμου της ιστορίας της ανθρωπότητος [on the law of human history]”, 
Ευρωπαϊκός Ερανιστής 4 (1840), pp. 315–327. 
130  charissis, Η σχέση Ανατολής–Δύσης [The east–West relationship], pp. 202–207.
131  markos Renieris, “Τι είναι η Ελλάς; Ανατολή ή Δύσις;” [What is greece? east or West?], 
Ερανιστής 2/3 (1842), pp. 189–215.
132 see the extract from kolettis’ speech in the national assembly on 14 January 1844 in 
c. Th. dimaras, Ελληνικός ρωμαντισμός [greek Romanticism], athens: ermis, 1982, pp. 
405–406.
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is the so-called “tripartite scheme”, a term coined by dimaras. The integration 
of the east into greek history and its univocal acceptance by the adherents of 
tradition, as well by the modernisers, was accomplished, as it is also known, 
through the notion of helleno-christianity and the hellenisation of Byzantine 
history. The eastern Roman empire was, for konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, 
a greek state. But even if greece was an independent cultural pole in the 
threesome, still the specific features of the greek character had to be defined 
and identified as eastern or Western in nature.133 spyridon Zambelios wrote 
on this dilemma that the orthodox greeks could not abandon “that eastern 
character that binds us to the Byzantine middle ages”.134 in any case, through the 
hellenisation of Byzantium, king otto assumed a special role as the instrument 
of the great idea and representative of the greeks inside and outside greece. 
he was, in theory, a challenger to the Byzantine throne and, in practice, a 
challenger to the ottoman provinces. “greek empire” was the slogan of those 
who supported participation in the crimean War;135 but this did not imply that 
they also renounced the importance of the West, if we may judge from Petros 
Vrailas-armenis’ work East and West (1854).136
in the second half of the nineteenth century, during the reign of king george 
i and even earlier, the debate on the great idea developed into a negotiation of 
the best method to reach constantinople, the undisputed national goal. The 
methods chosen by the politicians varied and occasionally contradicted each 
other: sometimes it was war and irredentism, others domestic modernisation. 
a compromise was not easy. Therefore “greece, which the european world 
had dreamed of becoming the epicentre of the union of the east with Western 
culture, ended up being considered an impediment to the future of the east.”137 
for decades this talk about the mockery, sneering and scorn exhibited by the 
West for the miserable greece reflected greece’s problems with the emerging 
133 c. Th. dimaras, Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος [constantinos Paparrigopoulos], 
athens: ermis, 1986, pp. 66–68.
134  charissis, Η σχέση Ανατολής–Δύσης [The east–West relationship], p. 214.
135 skopetea, Το “πρότυπο βασίλειο” [The “model kingdom”], p. 277.
136 Petros Vraïlas-armenis, “Ανατολή και Δύσις” [east and West], in Φιλοσοφικά Έργα 
[Philosophical works], ed. evangelos moutsopoulos and athanasia glycofrydi-leontsini, vol 
4B, athens: academy of athens, 1974, pp. 325–336. see also glycofrydi-leontsini’s views in 
“‘Ανατολη και Δύσις’: Ταυτότητα και ετερότητα στο νεοελληνικό στοχασμό του 18ου και 
19ου αι. [“east and West”: identity and otherness in 18th- and 19th-century modern greek 
thought], in Ταυτότητες στον ελληνικό κόσμο (από το 1204 έως σήμερα) [identities in the 
greek world: from 1204 to the present day], ed. konstantinos a. dimadis, athens: european 
society of modern greek studies, 2011, vol. 5, pp. 94–106.
137 skopetea, Το “πρότυπο βασίλειο” [The “model kingdom”], p. 241.
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Balkan states as well as with the capitalist and technological paradigm of the West 
that had led to the replacement of age-old philhellenism with economic interests. 
it also reflected the social repercussions of greek modernisation.138 liberal 
intellectuals and politicians emphasised the preparation of the greek nation-state 
institutionally, military and financially. They were guided by rationalism but also 
by elitism, and their recipe was not without serious and articulated critique.139 
The vision of the eastern empire had been undermined by nationalisms forged 
in the West, the Uniate church of Rome, useless parliamentary debates and the 
lack of strength and inspiration. in 1875 dimitrios Vernadakis wrote against the 
european institutions that had been introduced by king otto as well as against all 
other Western influences. Western civilisation had been influenced by classical 
letters, yet, in essence, it was Roman and german, unsuitable for the greek 
nation. it had been shaped by developments of which greece was not a part.140 
moreover, the West, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was in crisis 
itself and remitted its problems to the east. The critique of Professor georgios 
mistriotis (1891) is typical of this view:
it was bad fortune for the small greek kingdom that it was established 
with the valuable contribution of the great european ideologists. no 
sooner had it begun to develop than a vulgar materialism suddenly 
prevailed, which is now ravaging europe, and the relevant rapacity, 
which not only impeded the rebirth [of greece] is also threatening the 
security of most of the greek lands.141
all in all, greece had rushed to change its national costume with frankish dress, 
but now it was sitting powerless and swinging between east and West, unable 
to steer a proper course. 
138 “old philhellenism sank in the suez canal and was crushed under the wheels of the 
railways constructed by British capital in turkey” (Ελπίς, 18 July 1867), cited by skopetea, 
Το “πρότυπο βασίλειο” [The “model kingdom”], pp. 166, 241–242.
139 Paschalis kitromilides, “Η συμβολή της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής σκέψης στη δημιουργία 
του ελληνικού φιλελευθερισμού: Η δεύτερη Εθνοσυνέλευση του 1862–1864 και η υποδοχή των 
ιδεών του Τζων Στούαρτ Μιλλ στην Ελλάδα” [The contribution of european political thought in 
the creation of greek liberalism: The second national assembly of 1862–64 and the reception of 
John stuart mill’s ideas in greece], in Ο Φιλελευθερισμός στην Ελλάδα: Φιλελεύθερη θεωρία και 
πρακτική στην πολιτική και στην κοινωνία της Ελλάδος [liberalism in greece: liberal theory and 
practice in greece’s politics and society], ed. e. arabatzis et. al., athens: estia, 1991, pp. 49–73.
140  Varouxakis, “The idea of ‘europe’”, p. 26.
141  Roxani d. argyropoulos (ed.), Η φιλοσοφική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα από το 1828 ως το 
1922 [Philosophical thought in greece from 1828 to 1922], vol. 2, athens: gnosi, 1998, p. 600.
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The modernisers supported trikoupis’ modern Party (Νεωτερικό Κόμμα). 
The former Russophiles (embarrassed at the growing antislavism) and the 
francophile radicals (descendants of kolettis’ irredentism) together supported 
deliyannis’ national Party (Εθνικόν Κόμμα). it was a party explicitly opposed 
to trikoupis’ vehement and Western-oriented reformist programme. in 1893 
deliyannis stated in Parliament that “the interest of our fatherland demands […] 
to venture to suspend the force with which our society is adapting morals not of 
our land and alien habits improper to our traditions”.142 Behind the formation of 
the national Party and social group of anti-modernisers lay a parallel ideological 
development of paramount importance: the emphasis on folk character and of 
the people as the agent of greek purity, as opposed to the educated elite. as early 
as 1864, alexander goudas insisted that, “in other parts of the world the blossom 
of society is exclusively the upper class. on the contrary, in the east whatever is 
worthwhile by its nature […] is to be found in the middle and lower classes.”143 
apparently, this shift was related to the emphasis placed by the Romantics on 
the vivid experience of the greek middle ages without, however, renouncing 
or reducing the worship for antiquity. it also affected the literate paradigm and 
was related to the rising study of folklife (λαογραφία) and demoticism, since 
the supporters of the demotic vernacular held europe responsible for the 
degradation of the people’s language and culture. The language Question led 
back to the delicate debate on the most effective way to assimilate the non-greek-
speaking orthodox of greek extraction, in other words, which form of the greek 
language was the most appropriate for its eastern mission. The emphasis on the 
“people”, as has already been mentioned, was a german-inspired alternative 
to the social impasse, which represented for eastern societies the impeccable 
example of the West.144 as a result of that example
a specific social class was constructed within the nation, in the 
character of which neither the greek nor the foreign element can clearly 
be distinguished; it is an indistinct mixture of national purity and 
european make-up. This class, supported by its wealth and under state 
protection, enlarged its circle and in an astonishing way destroyed the 
internal coherence and the uniformity of the nation; suddenly two kinds 
of people [laoi] were shaped, fighting against each other.145
142  gunnar hering, Τα πολιτικά κόμματα στην Ελλάδα 1821–1936 [The political parties 
in greece, 1821–1936], trans. Thodoros Paraskevopoulos, athens: ΜΙΕΤ, 2006, vol. 1, p. 
591, n. 167. 
143  charissis, Η σχέση Ανατολής–Δύσης [The east–West relationship], p. 235.
144  ibid., pp. 235–236.
145  skopetea, Το“πρότυπο βασίλειο” [The “model kingdom”], p. 242.
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But all these “golden flies” and the “caviar-eating” stock market investors, the 
by-products of bourgeois financial liberalism, were not pure members of greek 
society.146 as the press pointed out, they molested greece. angelos Vlachos 
and aristotelis Valaoritis argued that greece was not related to this continent 
torn apart by financial interest, “to this aged europe inflamed with monetary 
questions”.147 comments like the above had an alternative meaning. alongside 
romantic nationalism was the growth of socialist ideology, identified on the one 
hand with demoticism and on the other with an eastern federation. it was a new 
imperial idea, adapted to democratic and federal european standards, which also 
reintroduced (from the left) the convenient political vision of feraios. 
in the two decades preceding the great War, greece was troubled by a 
deep crisis.148 instead of rejuvenating the east, it had languished: bankruptcy, 
defeat, perverse parliamentarianism, political instability, fierce confrontation 
in ottoman macedonia against Bulgaria and Romania, the loss again of the 
Powers’ favour and the international Public debt administration (Pda). 
irredentism seemed to be doomed because of the state’s failure to respond 
to modernisation. This line of critique – irredentism conditioned by 
modernisation – represented a quality transformation of greek nationalism 
and was relentless.149 not even king george was untouchable. greece needed 
146  it is worth mentioning that deliyannis’ supporters had indicted trikoupis as an apatris 
(lacking devotion to the nation) and as an agent of the foreigners. see hering, Τα πολιτικά 
κόμματα στην Ελλάδα [The political parties], p. 589, n. 157. The chasm between the greeks 
within the national borders, adherents of an agrarian and comprador economy, with those 
in the diaspora, mediators between the european capital and the greek economy, is analysed 
from a marxist viewpoint in the works of costis moskov, constantine tsoucalas and costas 
Vergopoulos. see costis moskov, Η εθνική και κοινωνική συνείδηση στην Ελλάδα 1830–1909: 
Ιδεολογία του μεταπρατικού χώρου [national and social consciousness in greece, 1830–1909], 
athens: olkos, 1974; costas Vergopoulos, Εθνισμός και οικονομική ανάπτυξη [nationalism 
and economic development], athens: exantas, 1978; Vergopoulos, Κράτος και οικονομική 
πολιτικήστον 19ο αιώνα. (Η ελληνική κοινωνία (1880–1895) [state and economic policy in the 
nineteenth century: greek society, 1880–1895), athens: exantas, 1978; constantine tsoucalas, 
Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή: Ο κοινωνικός ρόλος των εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα 
(1830–1922) [dependence and reproduction: the social role of education in greece], athens: 
Themelio, 1985.
147  Varouxakis, “The idea of ‘europe’”, p. 27; dimaras, Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος 
[konstantinos Paparrigopoulos], p. 67.
148 The ideological ferment of the period is thoroughly examined in gerasimos augustinos’ 
monograph, Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897–1914, new 
York: east european Quarterly, 1977.
149  for an analysis of the 1897 generation’s ideology, see george leontaritis, “Εθνικισμός 
και Διεθνισμός: Πολιτική Ιδεολογία” [nationalism and internationalism: political ideology], in 
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deeds, action, strength, resilience, true heroes; like second lieutenant Pavlos 
melas, recently killed in action in macedonia, and the newly “discovered” 
makrygiannis, the pure 1821 revolutionary. it needed projects, targets, a 
challenging future, strong executives, a strong king; not talk, theories, past 
glories and politicians. in november 1905 neoklis kazazis mentioned in one 
of his many lectures that:
all of the peoples of the ottoman empire would follow a vigorous 
greek endeavour under the leadership of a reigning king who 
descended from the marbled king, the armed prophet of the national 
right […] We are in need of an armed king, we are in need of a 
monarch who will tell us: forward!150
The greeks should return to their roots, rediscover anew their own power and 
own resources, disassociate themselves from the Pda, be armed, passionately 
hate their enemies, not expect the least from europe, fight against xenomania, 
subordination and servility to the West, against the materialism of a comfortable 
lifestyle, the “Jewish-style cosmopolitanism”. These were the combined 
arguments of the demoticists but also of the anti-liberal nationalists of the 
national society (Εθνική Εταιρεία); they were the words of Periklis Yannopoulos 
and of dragoumis, very pleasant music to the ears of a wider audience, 
encompassing much more than the supporters of deliyannis.151 Yannopoulos 
explained: 
The creation of greek life is impossible to start as long as all the 
substance of life, from the first shred of the cradle to the last shred of the 
grave, are alien. striking xenomania should be the first initiative, the 
first fight of those who wish to struggle for a greek start. Xenomania 
is vulgar. it is cheap. it is nonsense. it is an absence of honour. it is an 
absence of patriotism. it is vanity. it is ignorance.152
This allegation, of the greek soul turning frankish, was much older and very 
widespread as an expression of contempt and shame. it was worse than imitation; 
in reality, it was submission. kostis Palamas tried to distinguish “frankism 
Ελληνισμός και ελληνικότητα: Ιδεολογικοί και βιωματικοί άξονες της νεοελληνικής κοινωνίας 
[hellenism and hellenicity: ideological and experiential axis of the greek society], ed. d. g. 
tsaoussis, athens: estia, 1983, pp. 27–35.
150 Thanassis Bohotis, Η ριζοσπαστική δεξιά: Αντικοινοβουλευτισμός, συντηρητισμός και 
ανολοκλήρωτος φασισμός στην Ελλάδα 1864–1911: Έρευνες για σύγχρονες πολιτικές ιδεολογίες 
[The radical right: anti-parliamentarism, conservatism and incomplete fascism in greece, 
1864–1911: studies in modern political ideologies], athens: Vivliorama, 2003, p. 451. 
151 ibid., pp. 407–494. 
152 Periklis Yannopoulos, “Η ξενομανία” [Xenomania], Ο Νουμάς 1/5 (1903), p. 4.
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(francophilia)” from “europeanism”, the former being a pejorative term and 
the latter an ingredient of hellenism. But this was not an easy venture.153
in the same years, dragoumis, a close friend of Yannopoulos, through 
his macedonian experience, created a self-contained and uncultivated greek 
cultural model, not to europeanise the east, but to integrate it into a greek 
eastern empire. he rejected the West and the greek state as a Western creation, 
built on classicism and katharevousa, forced to live a borrowed and false life.154 
dragoumis’ vision was by definition opposed to that of Venizelos’ liberals 
and, occasionally, also to that of the socialists, although he shared with them 
their contempt of german militarism. it was only natural that the nationalist 
demoticists and the romantic nationalists alike joined the People’s Party (Λαϊκόν 
Κόμμα) against (what seemed to them) a revival of the elitist and plutocratic 
trikoupism, surfacing anew under Venizelos’ leadership. 
This conclusion does not imply that the People’s Party was truly anti-Western 
in its majority (despite the anti-Western rockets launched occasionally by a few 
of its leaders), or that it shared dragoumis’ vision for the east. it focused on the 
promotion of greekness as a value and the traditions of “small but honourable 
greece”, investing this quest with a strong, easily retrievable, and handy anti-
Western rhetoric that was adaptable to circumstance. Their arsenal of arguments, 
however, contained more than strictly anti-Western arguments. By that time, the 
struggle for macedonia and the events of the Balkan Wars had created a common 
asset of popular and national achievements as well as stereotypes, accessible 
to all: the triumphs of the greek brigands in macedonia in spite of the state’s 
“impeccable stance”, which was a synonym for national humiliation; the triumph 
of the war option in 1912 against the will of the Powers; the glory of the kilt-
wearing soldier (evzone), who was the humble but robust popular avenger of 
the nation’s enemies; the heart and the honour (φιλότιμο) of the greek fighter 
– sometimes a man with a pious soul, at other times a bloodthirsty superman; 
the Balkan alliance refashioned conveniently on the vision of Rhigas; king 
constantine Xii (not i), the soldier king and future emperor confronting age-
old enemies. The same achievements, seen from a different angle, constituted the 
triumph of urban rationalism, which had set up the state, military and diplomatic 
requirements for greek expansion. 
after the Balkan Wars, both sides, the modernisers and the anti-Westerners, 
felt (and perhaps they were) historically justified and ready for another round 
153  Varouxakis, “The idea of ‘europe’”, p. 28; dimaras, Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος 
[konstantinos Paparrigopoulos], p. 67.
154  Varouxakis, “The idea of ‘europe’”, p. 29.
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of eastern glories, yet not regardless of the risk, the method and the allies. They 
were both inspired by a common urban nationalism, that of the great idea, but 
they had not reached a common view on the proper course; because planning 
that course presupposed the conclusion of the “metaphysical” negotiation of the 
greek position between the east and the West.155 in the early twentieth century, 
many ideas, not too dissimilar from each other, had been coined and laid on the 
table: for some, the image of europe was identified with cultural decadence; for 
others it was an image of superiority. a few supported the idea that european 
superiority was to be attributed to greek origins; therefore greece was the 
appropriate commissioner of the West in the east. others claimed the same 
role on behalf of a distinct and self-contained greek culture, not of the european 
kind.156 a revealing initiative of the progressive magazine Γράμματα addressed 
an open question to educated greeks concerning the new targets of the state and 
its relation to europe.157 The variety of responses proved that this national debate 
had not been settled. most responses were in favour of differentiating from or, at 
least, having only selective contact with the european model. in their view, the 
greek nation could be self-contained. “We will borrow whatever we need but 
we will be free debtors, not the slaves of a foreign culture,” asserted the radical 
scholar and demoticist Petros Vlastos.158 grigorios Papamichail, professor of 
theology at the University of athens, responded: “it would not be fit to use the 
european standard to measure our own matters.”159
it is well known that this debate did not cease either at the end of the great 
War or after the disaster. in the early interwar years, the memory of the national 
155 Rena stavridi-Patrikiou suggests that the Balkan Wars constitute a landmark in 
the history of anti-Westernism in greece. The annexation of the new territories and the 
revivification of the Byzantium legacy rekindled the question of greece’s relation to the 
West. Rena stavridi-Patrikiou, “Ο φόβος της Δύσης [The fear of the West]”, Ευρώπη και 
νέος Ελληνισμός [europe and modern hellenism], athens: society for the study of modern 
greek civilisation and general culture, 2001, pp. 131–139.
156 ibid., pp. 31–32. The argument of greece’s mission to civilise the east and its role as a 
scout of the West was used both by the Venizelists and important anti-Venizelists during the 
asia minor campaign. see spyros g. Ploumidis, Τα μυστήρια της Αιγηϊδος: Τo μικρασιατικό 
ζήτημα στην ελληνική πολιτική (1821–1922) [The secrets of the aigeis: The asia minor 
question in greek politics (1821–1922)], athens: estia, 2016, pp. 202–207.
157 Έρευνα για τις μελλοντικές κατευθύνσεις της φυλής [survey on the future goals of our 
race]. according to the introduction, Γράμματα addressed the question in the summer of 
1913. Various answers it received were occasionally published in the following years, only to 
circulate them as a whole in 1919 in the pamphlet in question. 
158 ibid., p. 55.
159 ibid., p. 80.
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schism was preserved and – selectively and in times of political tension – charged 
the judgments of the present, with varying degrees of sentiment. Yet greece’s 
relations with the foreign West were not affected. This time realism prevailed.160 
The question of “east or West” was not obliterated but was transformed. There was 
no choice: The dissolution of the empires, the rise of turkish nationalism, and the 
greek defeat in asia minor cancelled in the most definite and dramatic way all ideas 
for the restitution of an eastern empire. The presence, however, of one-and-a-half 
million refugees strengthened the memory of the “eastern part” (to cite elytis) of 
hellenism. The question of greece’s due future and its cultural relations with the 
West was rephrased within a context, more extroverted and dynamic. Various 
groups of scholars, writers and artists defended a new national ideal, rediscovered 
the “native” as well as the “oriental” elements of modern greek civilisation, and 
assumed a critical stance vis-à-vis the “decaying” Western culture. in general, the 
generation of the Thirties did not reject european culture but competed with it. it 
was no longer a relation between the underage apprentice and its mature master. 
This was a competition between equal partners, to say the least.161
more than 30 years ago, george mavrogordatos presented the national 
schism as a crisis of national unification, defined by geographical, political, 
economic and social criteria.162 at the level of ideology, he combined anti-
Venizelism with “the introverted patriotism of old greece and the romantic 
nostalgia for a mythical past”, whose geographic frontiers to the south of olympus 
had secured unity before the cataclysmic state unification masterminded by 
Venizelos. We may move a step forward. The national schism might also be 
considered as an episode of the broader and much older greek ideological drama, 
160 despina Papadimitriou, Από τον λαό των νομιμοφρόνων στο έθνος των εθνικοφρόνων: 
Η συντηρητική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα 1922–1967 [from the law-abiding people to the nation of 
the nationally minded: conservative thought in greece, 1922–1967], Αthens: savalas, 2006, 
pp. 62–64.
161 dimitris tziovas, Ο μύθος της γενιάς του Τριάντα: Νεοτερικότητα, ελληνικότητα και 
πολιτισμική ιδεολογία [The myth of the generation of the Thirties: modernity, greekness and 
cultural ideology], athens: Polis, 2011, pp. 256–269. see also katerina Papari’s observations 
in Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο: Το πολιτικό πρόγραμμα των Π. 
Κανελλόπουλου, Ι. Θεοδωρακόπουλου και Κ. Τσάτσου [greekness and bourgeois intelligentsia 
in the interwar period: the political programme of P. kanellopoulos, i. Theodorakopoulos 
and k. tsatsos], athens: asini, 2017, pp. 105–106.
162 george mavrogordatos, “Ο Διχασμός ως κρίση εθνικής ολοκλήρωσης” [The national 
schism as a crisis of national integration], in Ελληνισμός και Ελληνικότητα: Ιδεολογικοί και 
βιωματικοί άξονες της νεοελληνικής κοινωνίας [hellenism and hellenicity: ideological and 
experiential axes of modern greek society], ed. dimitrios g. tsaoussis, athens: estia, 1988, 
pp. 69–78. see also Bohotis’ approach, “Εσωτερική Πολιτική” [domestic politics], pp. 93–100.
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that of the tantalising and incomplete “return” to the east via the european West. 
it goes without saying that the national schism during World War i was not 
caused by the controversy between romantic and liberal nationalisms. it would 
also be a mistake to equate all the royalist enemies of Venizelos with the enemies 
of europe and the Venizelists with its defenders. This was made clear in the first 
part of this article as well as in the second, where the making of the ideologies 
was described. strictly speaking, it was not a bipolar confrontation, because there 
was more than one version of the West and the supporters of the east employed 
occidental arguments.163
europe, be it western, central or eastern, could not be erased wholesale from 
the greek imagination, no matter how intensively greek interests were invoked. 
however, the schism did select from the east–West debate whatever arguments 
were necessary to invest military and political choices with a “deeper” meaning. 
These arguments included: greek kingship or imperium; federalism; the rhetoric 
against Western culture (of either the imperialists or the militarists); the decay of 
philhellenism; the negation of the subordination to the Powers; the importance 
or the burden of cultural relations with the east; condemning the imitation of 
the West; levantinism as a sickness; the importance of folk culture; the critique 
of capitalism and of greek plutocrats. all the aforementioned were the terms 
of an ongoing debate between nationalists, socialists and demoticists, which, 
of course, had to be adapted, sometimes improperly, to the current military 
alliances and their reshuffling after World War i at the expense of greece. 
This not unknown debate was much more essential in our view for the making 
of the schism. it is not speculative to argue that, with all of its intensity and 
simplicity, it subdued and assimilated in the east–West scheme the diplomatic 
and political war dilemmas of greece and strengthened the anti-Western critique 
at a time when liberalism seemed to triumph. it bequeathed to the greek national 
imagination experiences and arguments which affected, to a certain degree, the 
interwar debate on what it meant to be greek and european. in 1937, Panagiotis 
kanellopoulos recognised Yannopoulos as the forerunner and most important 
defender of greek civilisation but remarked that the latter’s mistake was that 
“he had cursed europe”. for kanellopoulos, the spiritual rejuvenation of greece 
could not be accomplished outside europe: “We will not be reborn except inside 
europe,” he stressed, before adding as a fleeting comment, “to save her”.164
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
163 kitromilides, “europe and the dilemmas of greek conscience”, pp. 11–13.
164 Papari, Ελληνικότητα και αστική διανόηση [greekness and bourgeois intelligentsia], 
p. 106.
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